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The post-crisis capital flows boom
•  In the 2nd quarter of 2009, a new wave of 
capital inflows to Emerging-Market 
Economies (EMEs) has come up, due to the 
post-global financial crisis (GFC) setting:
• Monetary policy in advanced economies;
• Double-speed recovery
• From the 1st  quarter of 2010 to mid-2011, the 
Euro crisis
The post-crisis capital flows boom
• The boom has gone through some mini-burst phases, such as in the 
second semester of 2011 (due to the Euro crisis worsening) and between 
May and mid-September 2013, sparked by the Fed’s tapering plans, which 
led to outflows from EME´s and sell-off of their currencies
Extracted from BIS Quartely Review, September 2013. 
Extracted from BIS Quartely Review, September 2013. 
The post-crisis capital flows boom
• However, apparently, the boom phase is not over yet. Revealing the key-role of 
US monetary policy in the post-crisis boom,  in face of the Fed´s surprise 
decision on 17 September to sustain its stimulus programme, international 
capital markets have reopened to EME´s issuers and EME´s currencies have 
rallied again, with the biggest gains seen in those that had been hardest hit.
Depreciation
Apreciation
• Higher annual values in comparison with the pre-crisis boom
• Predominance of financial  inflows, among which carry trade 
operations stood out, searching for « interest rate differentials »
The post-crisis capital flows boom
Financial 
flows
• EMEs faced concerns over the undesirable implications of high and volatile 
capital flows, among which the “currency war”, in a context of high growth 
rates and inflationary pressures
The post-crisis boom: currency war
• The adoption of a restrictive monetary policy would help to 
contain growth and inflationary pressures, but it would
•  encourage further capital inflows, which, in turn, would
 
•  foster asset price booms and exchange rate 
misalignments
• aggravating the risk of future sudden stops and 
subsequent financial crises.
The post-crisis boom: policy dilemmas
The post-crisis boom: policy dilemmas
• In order to deal with these policy dilemmas, some 
EMEs have resorted to Capital Account 
Regulations - CAR (capital controls and 
prudential financial regulations) to halt the trend 
of currency appreciation and to reduce the risks 
of speculative bubbles in asset prices.
• Thus, unlike the pre-crisis context, many EMEs 
are now unwilling to adopt a hands-off approach 
to capital inflows 
The post-crisis boom: some examples of CARs
 
País  Capital controls  Prudential regulation  
Brazil  
 
 
Financial tax  on portfolio investment  (equity 
and fixed income)  in the domestic market 
and externa l lending   
 
Non-interest reserve requirement  on 
bank´s short dollar positions in the FX 
spot market  
 
Peru  
 
Financial tax on portfolio investment (equity 
and fixed income)  
 
Limits on bank´s FX short dollar 
positions in the FX spot market and 
reserve requirement s on FX deposits  
Korea  
 
Withholding tax on nonresidents’ purchases 
of treasury and monetary stabilization bonds  
 
Many restrictions on banks’ FX 
derivatives positions and FX  assets and 
liabilitie s  
 
Indonesia  One month holding period on central bank 
bills (SBIs)   
 
Reserve requirement s on FX deposits  
 
 
Thailand  Incentives to capital outflows and financial 
tax on nonresidents’ purchases of public 
bonds  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The post-crisis boom: FX derivatives
• Besides the management of capital inflows, 
Brazil and South Korea have also faced 
policy dilemmas related with non-resident and 
resident operations with FX derivatives, which 
is part of “cross-border finance”
• searching for yield agents could obtain huge 
profits from the interest rate differentials through 
the so-called derivatives carry trade
• a bet which results in a short position in the funding 
currency  (with lower interest rate) and a long position in 
the target currency (with higher interest rate)
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• The resumption of inflows following the GFC was led by 
portfolio inflows into debt and equity markets. Short-term 
bank debt remained lower than in the pre-crisis period. 
The case of  South Korea
• This composition of cross-border inflows was a consequence 
of the strategy launched by South Korea since Nov/2009 to 
deal with the new boom in cross-border finance (capital 
flows + FX derivatives), which has been shaped by the huge 
contagion effect of the GFC on the country´s currency and 
banking markets.
• This effect was the result of the institutional framework of 
South Korea’s FX derivatives market
• operations carried out by export corporations in the onshore OTC 
market, wherein gains or losses are liquidated in US dollars (i.e. they 
are deliverable). Then, they are linked to large short-term external debt 
contracted by the country’s banks, which are the counterparts in these 
operations.
The case of South Korea
Won–USD Exchange Rate and CARs Measures
The case of South Korea: regulatory response
• Then, financial prudential regulation has been sufficient to 
curb FX derivatives operations and the currency 
appreciation: OTC market and bank´s as counterparts 
• SK is the only OECD member that has adopted 
CARs after the GFC crisis. 
• South Korean authorities have been able to launch these 
measures (despite the constraints implied by this 
membership) insofar they adopted, predominantly, financial 
prudential regulations.
• Regarding capital controls, the main one was the 
withholding tax on foreign holdings of domestic 
securities, whose impact on portfolio inflows has 
been marginal due to the double taxation treaties 
(under BITs) that SK has with more than 70 countries
The case of South Korea: regulatory 
response
Overview
• The post-crisis capital flows cycle
•  The case of Korea
•  The case of Brazil
•  Design principles
Overview
• The post-crisis capital flows cycle
•  The case of Korea
•  The case of Brazil
•  Design principles
1,00
1,20
1,40
1,60
1,80
2,00
2,20
2,40
0,0%
2,0%
4,0%
6,0%
8,0%
10,0%
12,0%
14,0%
16,0%
Ja
n-0
7
M
ar-
07
M
ay
-0
7
Ju
l-0
7
Se
p-0
7
N
ov
-0
7
Ja
n-0
8
M
ar-
08
M
ay
-0
8
Ju
l-0
8
Se
p-0
8
N
ov
-0
8
Ja
n-0
9
M
ar-
09
M
ay
-0
9
Ju
l-0
9
Se
p-0
9
N
ov
-0
9
Ja
n-1
0
M
ar-
10
M
ay
-1
0
Ju
l-1
0
Se
p-1
0
N
ov
-1
0
Ja
n-1
1
M
ar-
11
M
ay
-1
1
Ju
l-1
1
Se
p-1
1
N
ov
-1
1
Ja
n-1
2
M
ar-
12
M
ay
-1
2
Ju
l-1
2
Se
p-1
2
N
ov
-1
2
Source: Brazilian Central Bank. Author´s elaboration.
BRL/USD exchange rate (right axe) Brazil Risk
Diferencial de juros CDS Brazilian Policy rate
Fed Fund Rate
Note: (1)  Brazilian Policy Rate plus Brazil Risk minus Fed Fund Rate
Interest rate differential and nominal exchange rate
The case of Brazil: restrictive monetary policy
Blue line: 
Interest rate 
differential
Red line: 
policy rate
• During the post-crisis boom, Brazil has offered a very high 
policy rate related with its inflation-target policy
Interest rate differencials
• ..... and, consequently, the greatest interest rate differential in comparison 
with other EME´s, which increased even more from March 2010 to July 
2011
The case of Brazil: interest rate differentials
Non-resident capital flows to emerging market economies and 
to Brazil (USD billion)
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• Brazil has been one of the main destinations of the new 
capital inflows boom => canonical carry trade
The case of Brazil: capital inflows
The case of Brazil: derivatives carry trade
• Non-resident and resident agents engaged in the derivatives carry trade => 
net short positions in the FX future markets (as the FX future contract is the 
price of the USD)
• Foreign institutional investors, primarily hedge funds, have been the most important investor 
group in the Brazilian FX future market, fostering the appreciation of the BRL through 
derivatives carry trade.  
Investor´s net positions in FX futures 
The case of Brazil: FX derivatives regulation
• FX derivatives operations are 
concentrated on future market and carried 
not only by banks, but also by non-resident 
investors, non-financial resident agents. 
Then, CARs are insufficient to curb them: 
• Prudential financial regulations only reaches 
resident financial institutions
• Capital controls only influence cross-border 
transactions and, thus, do not cover FX 
derivatives operations in the FX future market.
             
Regulation
Agents
Market 
(spot vs. 
derivatives)
Financial vs. 
non-financial
Resident vs. 
Non-resident
Prudential 
regulation
Financial 
institutions
Resident Spot and 
derivatives 
FX derivatives 
regulation
Both Both Derivatives 
(onshore)
Capital 
controls
Portfolio Both Non-resident Spot
Foreign 
loans
Both Resident Spot
•  Then, Brazilian policy makers need to adopt, along with 
CARs, the here called FX derivatives regulation (financial tax 
on excessive net short positions in the FX derivatives 
markets)  
The case of Brazil: FX derivatives regulation
Cross-border finance regulatory framework
BRL/USD exchange rate and regulations
The case of Brazil: regulatory response
• Price-based Capital controls (financial tax on portfolio investments) was 
adopted too late and was insufficient to curb the appreciation trend. Why?
• The wider interest rate differential stimulated regulatory arbitrage through the FX 
derivatives market and the build up of short dollar positions by banks in the spot FX 
market. 
Currency 
Appretiation of 
28%
Contagion 
effect of the 
GFC
BRL/USD exchange rate and regulations applied
The case of Brazil: regulatory response
• Only after Jan/2011 (Dilma´s government), when Brazilian policy markers adopted all of the three 
kinds of regulations  (capital controls, prudential financial regulation and FX derivatives regulation), the 
policy succeeded in curbing the currency appreciation trend 
• Macroeconomic regime change: curbing the currency appreciation became a target of this regime as, in the 
post-crisis setting, the increased competition in the manufactured goods market unveiled  the adverse 
impact of this appreciation on the Brazilian industry competitiveness
• Along with the broader regulatory framework, policy rate 
cuts have also discouraged canonical carry trade
The case of Brazil: capital inflows
•Brazil has only been able to launch 
this broad regulatory toolkit because 
the successive Brazilian 
governments did not make 
commitments in GATS and FTAs 
and BITS that could jeopardize their 
policy space to carry out CARs and 
FXDRs
The case of Brazil: policy space
• It´s worth to mention that the Brazilian government 
has begun to withdraw some CCs in December 2012. 
Over June and July 2013, the FXDR, the PR and 
most of the remaining CCs were withdrawn in face of 
the mini-burst caused by investors reaction to Fed´s 
tapering plans.
•  This setting brought to light the insufficiency of the 
regulations adopted during the boom to curb the 
currency depreciation in the burst phases, mainly 
the FXDR, which only punished excessive bets in the 
currency appreciation, letting the other side 
(excessive bets in the BRL depreciation) unregulated. 
  
The case of Brazil: the withdrawn
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1.  Country-specific institutional aspects (such as the FX market framework 
and the degree of financial openess), have to be taken into account in the 
designing of the tailor-made regulatory framework, namely, the specific mix of 
capital controls, prudential regulation and FX derivatives regulation.
2.  In countries with sophisticated and open financial markets, the 
macroeconomic environment has an important influence on the effectiveness 
of Cross-Border Finance Regulation. As a wider interest rate differential 
stimulates regulatory arbitrage, measures have to be even more dynamic, 
flexible and adjustable, involving a steady “fine-tuning” to close the loopholes 
found by private agents.
3.  To make 1  and 2  viable, a country has to have permanent authority to 
regulate cross-border finance, then, do not make commitments in GATS and 
FTAs and BITS.
4. In the current setting of inexistence of a proper global economic governance 
structure, the cross-border finance regulation should punish excessive 
bets both in the appreciation and depreciation of the domestic currency.
‘Design principles’
 Thank you!
daniprates@eco.unicamp.br
